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Abstract 
Appropriate regulations are fundamental to effective protection for occupational 
health and safety.  This paper examines the process by which regulations are written 
and adopted.  Ideally, a body of reliable scientific evidence would point to the need for 
regulation.  A body of health and safety experts can examine the data and prepare 
regulatory language for implementation by the appropriate body.  Normally, a 
consultative body of experts from management, government, labour and academia 
oversees this process.  Ultimately, senior decision makers determine the regulation to 
be adopted.  Experience with ergonomic regulations in the US and Canada show that 
this linear process can be interrupted at many points.  In the US, no national ergonomic 
regulations exist after decades of effort offset by political intervention, while in British 
Columbia the adoption took years to achieve.  The parties’ health and safety experts are 
crucial.  They must understand the problems of regulation and enjoy the confidence of 
senior officials in their organizations to offset political opposition. 
Keywords: Health and Safety, Regulations 
JEL Codes: J8 
1. Introduction 
Systems to protect workers from workplace hazards are complex and 
subject to many influences. In some respects, the process begins with the 
establishment of appropriate rules for employers and workers--standards for 
working on or around machinery, structural features to avoid accidents, 
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exposure limits to chemicals or other contaminants, etc. A labour inspectorate 
with appropriate training and authority to ensure standards are followed is 
essential, including sanctions for violations. Insurance plans for the allocation 
of costs to employers or public health systems, including rehabilitation for 
injured workers are important.   All of these elements are important and have 
been examined in many countries. But the starting points are the rules to govern 
workplace safety, either specific requirements or more general performance 
standards. Relatively little attention has been given to the process by which 
safety standards are determined. The ILO Standard and Recommendation on 
Occupational Health and Safety barely treat this subject at all, for instance. 
Examination of these procedures sheds light on the challenges that safety 
professionals and policy makers face when seeking to reduce workplace 
hazards. 
Occupational health and safety frequently is described as an “integrative” 
issue in the workplace, i.e. one that brings employers and employees together in 
a common effort to prevent accidents and exposures and return injured workers 
to productive employment.  It is my thesis that occupational health and safety is 
often a “distributive” issue, one that generates considerable conflict and 
disagreement between employers and labour groups. Health and safety 
regulations are not value free (Wilson 1985). The nature and intensity of that 
conflict depends both on the structures by which health and safety standards are 
established, as well as the general state of employment relations in the broader 
society or in industries directly affected by a particular aspect of health and 
safety. 
Ergonomics:  Who can be against preventing back aches? 
On his first day in office in 2001, US President George W. Bush signed an 
executive order suspending all new federal regulations as his first official act.  
This order was aimed at a regulation enacted by the Clinton administration late 
in 2000 that required employers to take relatively modest steps to prevent 
musculoskeletal injuries.  The regulation required employers to examine work 
procedures for five common ergonomic risks, e.g. repetitive motions, heaving 
lifting, use of vibrating or impact tools, etc.  They were basically performance-
based or process regulations, rather than specific-standards. President Clinton’s 
regulation followed more than a decade of research and negotiations with 
employers by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), two extensive literature reviews on the subject by the National 
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Academy of Sciences and high level discussions in the U.S. Congress.  After 
President Bush acted, the Congress passed a “resolution of disapproval, 
“effectively killing the regulation after the President signed the bill.   
The end of the ergonomic regulation was the objective of a vigorous 
campaign by business associations, including manufacturing, trucking, 
computer makers, railroads, package delivery companies and the like. Their 
goal was to prevent the agency responsible for health and safety regulation, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) from enacting 
ergonomic regulations.  Ironically, some industry associations represented 
companies that had programs to prevent musculoskeletal injuries in their own 
workplaces.  Management groups also successfully challenged the draft 
regulations in court on the grounds that OSHA could not demonstrate that the 
economic benefits of the regulations would exceed the costs (Mogensen 2006). 
Turning the clock ahead a decade, President Barack Obama promised to 
enact ergonomic regulations to protect American workers in his presidential 
campaign.  After his election, OSHA proposed in 2010 a very modest regulation 
that would require employers to keep records of musculoskeletal injuries.  
OSHA officials declared that this regulation would not lead to stronger actions 
to reduce such injuries.  Even this proposal aroused strong opposition from the 
business community.  In January 2011, responding to complaints by “small 
business,” the Department of Labor cancelled these plans and said that it would 
set up meetings on the subject with other interested parties only “if requested” 
(Gruenberg 2011).  An OSHA spokesman declared that there were no plans to 
resurrect ergonomic regulations.   
The OSH Act permits states to enact their own regulations which meet or 
exceed the federal standards, an option that 27 states have accepted.  Two of the 
27 states, California and Washington, enacted regulations on ergonomics, and 
the Washington standard was overturned in a state-wide referendum in 2004 
(http://osha.gov/sltc/ergonomics/state_plans.html). 
During this same period, a tripartite committee of safety experts was 
convened in 1991 in British Columbia by the Workers’ Compensation Board, 
the body in that province that promulgates health and safety regulations for 
workers in most industries.  The Compensation Board had been re-organized 
with a tri-partite governance structure, one that was applauded by labour and 
management alike.  The regulation review committee was to examine all health 
and safety regulations for the first time in over a decade.  One of the topic 
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before the committee was ergonomic regulations, a relatively new subject in 
Canada not previously covered by regulation.  A subcommittee produced a set 
of detailed regulations covering ergonomics in a variety of industries, ranging 
from construction to offices.  There was general consensus on the regulations 
within the committee, although employer representatives expressed concern 
about the level of detail.  The subcommittee relied primarily on foreign research 
and experience, especially in Sweden, Australia and the US. 
By law, draft regulations must be subject to at least one public hearing 
before enactment.  Because of the importance of the topic, approximately 8 
hearings were held in different regions of the province.  The hearings produced 
a fire storm of objections from the employer community, often with 
presentations staged for local media.  Many industries asserted that the 
proposed regulations would make operations in the province impossible.  
Arguments that most of the regulations were already in use elsewhere bore little 
weight. 
A stalemate ensued.  Labour wanted regulations as soon as possible, and 
management grew more resistant.  Opposition politicians used these differences 
as issues against the governing social democratic party.  Internal discipline 
within the Board of Governors broke down. 
In 1995, the government dismissed all of the Board Governors of the 
Compensation Board (including myself) and installed a temporary chair to 
oversee the work of the Compensation Board until a new structure could be 
installed.   
The new administration withdrew the draft ergonomics regulations and 
sought to produce language more acceptable to management.  It reduced the 
level of prescription.  Even the use of the word “ergonomics” was reduced 
considerably.  A lengthy mediation process followed for all topics in the 
regulations that were contentious.  In 1998, ergonomic regulations were 
introduced with fairly specific language in the “general duty” chapter that 
regulates all industries. A conservative government elected in 2001 promised to 
reduce the “regulatory burden” on business.  Extensive deletions from the 
health and safety regulations followed, but the sections on ergonomics survived. 
The purpose of these two stories is not to demonstrate that one regulatory 
system is superior to another, but to illustrate the influence of different actors in 
the process of establishing regulations.  The thesis of this paper is that relations 
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among the actors in the health and safety communities, as well as labour and 
management are important determinants of the construction of a regulatory 
regime.   
2. Health and Safety Regulations:  Who are the actors? 
Most treatments of health and safety programs focus on the implementation 
of regulations.  The contents of regulations seem to arise from a rather 
mysterious process that is the purview of scientists and engineers.  However, 
the role of the actors is growing more important as our knowledge of 
occupational disease and workplace health hazards increases. 
The first group of actors is the technical experts, scientists, engineers, 
epidemiologists and the like.  These people apply their expertise to 
demonstrated or potential hazards of the workplace.  They are located in many 
institutions, government agencies, universities, specialized institutes, consulting 
firms and private laboratories.  For example, in a research program administered 
by the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia for a consortium of 
Canadian health and safety agencies, a group of scientists in Nova Scotia (an 
Eastern province of Canada) recently received funding to study the risk of radon 
exposure to workers there.  Another study in the same program examined the 
impact of higher than normal exposures to stress, pesticides, solvents, etc. on 
the incidence of Parkinson’s disease in the work force (WorkSafeBC 2011). 
There is a community of scientists who dedicate part or all of their careers 
to investigating the effects of workplace conditions on the health and safety of 
workers.   NIOSH is responsible for advising OSHA on scientific issues in the 
US.  As part of its mandate, it currently funds 17 university-based research 
centers.  The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK maintains a 
Laboratory Research Service to conduct research on occupational and 
environmental hazards.  Other national institutes carry out research. This 
community, which is very international, produces an impressive body of 
research on hazards and methods for their reduction.   
The second group of actors is the health and safety professionals who 
populate advisory committees, boards of research centers and occasionally 
regulatory bodies.  They occupy staff positions in employers, unions and 
government or social service agencies.  Occupational health and safety are not 
central concerns for most labour and business organizations unless the 
workplace hazards are unusually high.  Senior leaders, especially in peak 
associations, delegate responsibility for these functions to dedicated persons 
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with a strong interest and knowledge of the subject matter.  In many 
jurisdictions, the more prominent members of this group are accustomed to 
working together and develop mutual understanding and rapport.  They view 
health and safety regulations as more integrative than distributive and are 
accustomed to negotiating and reaching compromises necessary to produce 
acceptable regulations.  
The third group of actors is the agencies charged with promulgating 
regulations.  In general terms, there are two categories of these agencies, quasi-
independent bodies and government departments.  The former enjoy a degree of 
autonomy from government that can be significant.  The EU-OSHA, for 
example, is governed by a board with representatives of governments, unions 
and employers.  The Health and Safety Executive in the UK has a similar 
structure, with representatives of unions, employers and local governments.  
The regulatory agency in British Columbia, now known as WorkSafeBC has a 
government-appointed board of directors composed of representatives of 
employers, workers, rehabilitation professionals and the public.  Aside from the 
labour and employer representatives, board members have been appointed by 
the provincial government or private parties to other agency board. 
More commonly, ministries of labour or other government agencies are 
responsibility for establishing health and safety regulations.  In North America, 
national or provincial ministries control the issuance of regulations.  The British 
Columbia example I cited earlier is exceptional, and when political pressures 
became too strong for the government (a pro-labour party), it essentially took 
the organization under its control with instructions to moderate the conflict. 
Since regulations generally have the force of law, it is almost inevitable that 
government will intervene in their promulgation.  However, the relationship 
between the government and the specialized agency can be crucial.  A semi-
autonomous health and safety can insulate the rule-making process from overt 
political pressures. 
3. Decision Models 
If the theory of health and safety issues as integrative, rather than 
distributive, issues were correct, the decision path for regulations would be 
relatively straight forward.  Accident data or expert research would identify an 
existing or potential hazard, followed by discussions among safety 
professionals.  If consensus existed on the need for regulation, a specialized 
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agency would prepare a draft for review by a government agency or other body 
with the power to impose regulations.  The end point of the process would be a 
regulation addressing the problem in question, perhaps supplemented by non-
binding “guidelines.” 
As the ergonomics narrative above shows, there are many opportunities for 
deviations from this ideal path. 
Experts may have trouble reaching a consensus in the best of circumstances.  
Observations with human subjects are often hard to obtain, and epidemiological 
data are subject to varying interpretations.  The interaction between asbestos 
exposure and smoking as causes of asbestosis is accepted, but not completely 
understood after years of research, for instance.  Apart from the scientific 
problems, when costs of injuries or diseases are borne at least in part by 
employers, controversies over causality and allocation of cost are common.  If 
economic criteria are added to purely technical standards, i.e., the cost of 
imposing a regulation, the possibilities for disagreement increase (Ashford and 
Caldart 1996).  Moreover, not all research is disinterested.  The history of 
development of safety standards for lead in gasoline, tobacco smoke, asbestos, 
to cite a few examples, demonstrates that corporate interests sponsor research 
which invariably demonstrates that claims of hazards are exaggerated or simply 
inaccurate (Dorman 2006).  Apart from sponsored research, philosophical 
differences exist on the proper criteria for establishing regulations, balancing 
effectiveness and cost to employers or society (Ashford 2004). In addition, data 
are not always uniform across jurisdictions, so the empirical basis for decisions 
about the existence or importance of a hazard may be deficient.  For instance, 
there is considerable variation in the identification of occupational skin diseases 
in Eastern Europe, both among EU members and candidate states (von 
Hirschberg, et al. 2009). 
Assuming that the scientific or technical data are sufficiently clear, the next 
step normally is consultation with health and safety professionals.  Normally, 
these bodies are tri-partite and well suited to develop draft regulations.  These 
bodies are fairly common.  The EU has several, including the Emerging Risks 
Observatory and several advisory committees.  US law requires the National 
Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health.  In the British 
Columbia example cited above, a “Regulation Review Committee” screened 
available data and participated in the drafting of regulations. 
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In general, these bodies function successfully and without open controversy.  
Members come to know each other and grow accustomed to working 
collaboratively.  They have a shared interest in successful programs to reduce 
hazards in the workplace.  However, harmony does not always equal success.  
An observer of the HSE in the 1980s admired the sense of mutual respect that 
members displayed.  A tradition of consensus decision making, common such 
organizations, effectively gave management representatives a veto over any 
proposed regulation.  Perhaps as a result, the Executive produced few new 
initiatives (Wilson 1986). 
In the case of the draft ergonomic regulations in British Columbia cited 
above, the members of the subcommittee had reached substantial agreement 
(meaning there were reservations on the management side in particular) on the 
content of the proposed regulations before they were published for public 
hearings.  As the contents became known broadly, the tone of debate changed 
radically.  One can presume that senior management did not want the 
regulations for some reasons, and the business community launched a vigorous 
attack on the draft their representatives had helped to write.  The employer 
health and safety community could not withstand these pressures, and draft 
ultimately was withdrawn.  
This experience illustrates the internal political pressures on labour and 
management safety staff.  The companies, industry associations or unions that 
appoint and employ them inevitably have broader political agendas, which may 
or may not include safety.  The larger the organization, the more likely that 
larger political issues will intrude into discussions of occupational health and 
safety.  In the case of the ergonomics debate in the US, for example, computer 
manufacturers, the peak body representing large manufacturers, the small 
business lobby formed a coalition to oppose relatively weak ergonomics 
regulations.  Their chief lobbyist is the son of a Justice of the US Supreme 
Court who wrote an article deriding ergonomics as “junk science,” and 
ultimately was appointed by President Bush to a senior position in the 
Department of Labor (Mogensen 2006).  
In the UK the representatives in the HSE, an independent body combining 
regulation, education and enforcement, serve long terms and are accustomed to 
working together. These relationships have become institutionalized.  The HSE 
has staff to review hazards and proposed standards, including EU directives, 
and prepare recommendations.  Members of the HSE reach agreement on draft 
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regulations which are presented to Cabinet and ultimately to Parliament.  
Historically, HSE proposals have not been challenged at higher levels in the 
government (Wilson 1985). 
The EU system seems closer to the UK model.  The Council of European 
Communities enacted directive 89/391/EEC.  Subsequently, the Council 
established the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), 
with its own tripartite board of directors and staff.  The Agency is charged with 
gathering information, promoting health and safety, etc. and providing 
assistance or recommendations to the Community bodies, member states and 
interested groups (http://osha.europa.eu/en).  The Agency presents 
recommended regulations to the Commission and the European Parliament.  
A crucial element in the rule making process really is the relationship 
between the advisory committees and the broader labour, industrial and 
governmental stakeholders.  If safety experts can speak for their professional 
community as well as their sponsors, the creation and amendment of regulations 
can go smoothly.  Priorities of occupational health and safety drive the process 
rather than broader political issues.   Equally, if the sponsoring organizations 
support their work, it is unlikely that government will overrule expert advice. 
The final step in establishing rules is the promulgation of a draft standard by 
the body with the authority to make binding regulations, usually the ministry of 
labour.  At this point of the process, local or national political pressures and 
labour-management relations come into play.  The Occupational Health and 
Safety Act in the US deliberately assigned the authority to administer 
occupational health and safety programs, including the production of standards, 
to the Department of Labor.  While this is the logical department of the US 
government, the management community regarded this department as closely 
allied with the trade union movement.  This context set the scene for the 
political battles over regulations, of which the contest over ergonomic 
regulations summarized above is one example.  This political tension drew the 
US Congress into the establishment of regulations by various means, including 
authority over the OSHA budget. The battle over ergonomics a decade ago 
illustrates the complexity of the system.  The final element of complexity is the 
ability of either party, usually employers, to challenge regulations in civil courts 
on the grounds that they are too costly for the benefits derived (Mogensen 
2006).  By contrast, the Ministry of Labour in the UK appears to enjoy a better 
reputation within the business community.  In particular, the leading business 
association participates directly in drafting of regulations and its representatives 
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in the HSE have enjoyed the confidence of the management organizations 
(Wilson 1986).  It should be noted that the current British government has 
imposed a 35 per cent cut in the HSE budget by 2014/2015 and announced a 
review of the health and safety culture in the UK.  As an immediate result, the 
number of workplace inspections will be reduced, but other consequences are 
not yet clear (Hazards 2010). 
During the de-regulation movement in British Columbia in 2001-2003, the 
semi-autonomous compensation authority reduced the number of regulations by 
the required one-third through various techniques.  However, the heart of the 
regulatory framework was maintained, including several sections on prevention 
of musculoskeletal injuries remained intact.  In effect, the staff took over the 
process of de-regulation, and political supervision was either too weak or 
complicit in the retention the most important regulations. 
4. Conclusion 
This review of the regulatory process demonstrates that good science is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for good regulations.  Health and safety 
regulations inevitably involve some restrictions on management control of the 
workplace.  Normally, employers resist such intrusions on their domain, unless 
the costs of accidents are sufficiently high to justify regulation or a management 
philosophy that emphasis cooperation and cultivation of a work force.  The 
battles over ergonomics were provoked in part by the broad scope of 
musculoskeletal injuries, which in turn dictated an extensive regulatory 
framework, even if the terms were quite general. 
Thus, the procedures for formulating regulations are important, perhaps 
even vital, when a new field is approached.  The crucial elements in producing 
effective regulations appear to be first the production of good science from the 
technical community, supplemented by a group of practitioners or policy 
analysts who can translate the conclusions of research into regulations that will 
command support from employer and labour groups.  
Semi-corporatist structures with representation from major stakeholders in 
the economy appear to be essential.  Going back to ergonomics, neither the US 
nor British Columbia had established formal networks to vet possible 
regulations and secure support from peak organizations for these initiatives.  In 
the case of the US, the deep-seated hostility of labour and management at senior 
organizational levels presented a severe barrier to acceptance of new regulatory 
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topics.  This controversy has continued at the state level.  In March 2011, a 
newly-elected governor of Michigan blocked the implementation of any 
ergonomic regulation.  Under such conditions, considerable political will is 
required to enact regulations on contentious topics, and few national or local 
governments show enthusiasm for what is admittedly a complex subject. 
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